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Abstract-Suppose that two organizations with their own separate cryptosystems are put into a context in 
which they must communicate. An example might be two businesses-accustomed to using different 
commercial cryptosystems-which have recently merged. Each might mistrust the security of the other’s 
cryptosystem. But neither could quarrel with a process which took their two cryptosystems and yielded a 
third cryptosystem which was demonstrably at least as strong as either of the original two. This paper 
constructs a practical working model of such a “least upper bound” of two cryptosystems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that merely encrypting with system A followed by system B need not 
produce enhanced security. In fact B might even be inverse to A, so that cryptext equals 
plaintext in the composite system. There is, nevertheless, a simple way to take two cryp- 
tosystems, A and B, and produce a third cryptosystem C with the property that breaking C is 
equivalent o breaking both A and B. The recent discovery[l] of key safeguarding schemes 
(threshold schemes[2]) is the motivation behind this manner of combining cryptosystems to 
produce new ones. The process merely uses the hardware for the two systems, together with 
very fast simple hardware for merging them, and is about as fast as the slower of the two 
cryptosystems. As we shall see, one pays a price in message bandwidth expansion, inasmuch as 
the combined system produces cryptext about 3 times as long as the plaintext. Reasonable 
names for C might be join ([3], p. 8) of A and B, supremum of A and B, or least upper bound 
of A and B. We will adopt the first terminology and write C = A v B. 
Up to now there have been two dominant styles of cryptosystem security proof in the open 
literature. The Vernam one-time pad ([4], pp. 399-400; [5], pp. 394-399) is absolutely secure ([4], 
pp. 399-400; [5], pp. 398-399), but is not a true cryptosystem [6,7]. Rabin[8] and Williams [9] 
have recently produced quadratic analogs of RSA cryptosystems [lo] which are external/y 
relatively secure, in the sense that breaking them by what amounts to root extraction gives a 
way to solve an ostensibly hard problem outside cryptology, a case of the factoring problem in 
number theory [I I]. They are, however, susceptible to a chosen cryptext attack ([9], p. 729). 
Lempel, Even and Yacobi have provided another example[l2,13] of an externally relatively 
secure cryptosystem. Their cryptosystem is NP hard to crack but almost always easy to crack. 
This paper, which is influenced somewhat by them, introduces a third style, the internal 
relative security proof, which stays within a cryptographic frame of reference. This self 
contained frame of reference is reminiscent of the internal relative consistency proofs of 
mathematics, uch as the proof that hyperbolic geometry is consistent if Euclidean geometry is 
([14], pp. 343-346), or that X together with the continuum hypothesis is consistent if X is [18j. 
2. THE JOIN OF TWO CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
A key setting of a cryptosystem A is a triple (A, K, K*), where K is an encrypting key and 
K* is the corresponding decrypting key. Similarly (B, L, L*) for a cryptosystem B. In a public 
key (what Simmons[lS] calls an asymmetric) cryptosystem A the keys K and K* are distinct, 
and it is presumably not feasible to infer K* from K. In a conventional (symmetric) cryp- 
tosystem A the keys K and K* are equal. 
The flow diagram in Fig. 1 defines the cryptosystem A v B. It is apparent hat a given 
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Fig. 1. The cryptographic join A v B. 
cryptext message block (i.e. a given list of three synchronized block transmissions on channels 
0, 1 and 2) can be decrypted to yield the plaintext message block P if and only if one can 
recover the exclusive or (F XOR S) of the corresponding ancestral first random bit block F 
which was encrypted by cryptosystem A (using key K) and the corresponding second ancestral 
random bit block S which was encrypted by cryptosystem B (using key 15). 
Assume that a cryptanalyst has somehow devised an algorithm which has channels 1 
(carrying A,(F)) and 2 (carrying &(S)) as inputs, and has F XOR S as output. Thus he has a 
solution to the problem of breaking A v B. We claim that he then has the ability to break either 
A or B. Let us see how this makes it possible to break A. Assume system (A, K, K*) is in use, 
encrypting successive plaintext messages 
F(l), F(2), F(3), . . ., 
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AK(F(~)), &(F(2)), &(F(3)), . . . . 
He can hold the channel 2 input to his device fixed, say equal to M, while feeding the 
(.4, K, K*) cryptext into the channel 1 input. He does not know the plaintext B,.(M) ancestral 
to the “cryptext” M. But he has outputs 
F(1) XOR B,*(M), F(2) XOR B,.(M), F(3) XOR BLe(M), . . . . 
The problem of breaking A is thereby essentially reduced to the cryptanalytically trivial problem 
of discovering B,.(M), i.e. of breaking a “polyalphabetic ipher” having a “keyword” of 
known length by a cryptext only attack ([4], p. 402; [16], pp. 58-112; [17], pp. 34-85). The 
converse is also clear. Somebody who can break A operating with the key K and also break I3 
operating with the key L can obviously break A v B, operating with the key-pair (K, L). 
It is important to keep in mind the role of the “garbage utility” which delivers the random 
bit blocks on which the operation of the join crucially depends. It is essential that this 
sequence of blocks make up a bit stream without redundancy. If it is not a truly random 
irredundant source of equally likely zeros and ones then all bets are off and the cryptanalyst 
may be able to read traffic without breaking any cryptosystem involved. But this caution applies 
elsewhere as well. Even a one-time pad ([4], pp. 399-400; [5], pp. 394-399) system is no stronger 
than the random process which produces its pads. 
3. CONTEXTS AND GENERALIZATIONS 
The join of 3,4 or more cryptosystems can easily be produced by using channels 3,4,. . . in 
a diagram which has appropriately many further right hand columns and further XOR boxes in 
the obvious positions. The join of N - 1 cryptosystems thus obviously involves an Nfold 
plaintext message xpansion. It is approximately as fast as the slowest of the cryptosystems 
involved. J. Bloom has noted that the join is just one of a variety of possible ways to combine 
several cryptosystems. The “universal algebra[3] of cryptosystems” he has envisioned uses 
threshold schemes as finitary operations ([3], p Sl), and uses cryptosystems as numbers (i.e. as 
members of the set ([3], p. 5) on which the finitary operation is defined). The threshold scheme 
in this paper is the Vernam one-time pad[6] subcase of Bloom’s fast threshold scheme[7]. 
Suppose that the cryptosystems A and B are both one-to-one onto functions (i.e. bijections). 
Then so is A v B. This must be interpreted as follows. Once A, K, B and L are chosen, then to 
each input triple (P, F. S) there corresponds a unique output triple 
(P XOR F XOR S, AK(F), BL(S)). If both A and B are public key (i.e. asymmetric) cryp- 
tosystems then, obviously, A v B is a public key cryptosystem. The join of two digital 
signature schemes is a digital signature scheme. Suppose that A is a public key cryptosystem and B 
is a conventional (i.e. symmetric) cryptosystem. Then A v B is merely a conventional cryp- 
tosystem. But. in a sense. it behaves like a public key cryptosystem. The idea is as follows. An 
organization uses conventional channels to distribute a single encrypting/decrypting key L = L* 
for the conventional cryptosystem B to every member every week. Each member m publishes 
its own distinctive public encrypting key K(m) for the public cryptosystem A whenever it 
chooses, but keeps its private decrypting key K(m)* to itself. Thus, with no key distribution 
problem, any pair of members of the organization can communicate privately in A v B inside a 
security stockade as strong as both A and B. Outsiders must break both A (using the encrypting 
key K(m)) and B (using the encrypting/decrypting key L) to read traffic addressed to m. 
Insiders, who belong to the organization and therefore know L, can practice cryptanalysis 
against other insiders who are communicating with member m at a smaller cost than outsiders 
must pay, namely merely breaking A (using the encrypting key K(m)), i.e. by finding K(m)*. 
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